Boeing and SpaceX are using a “high risk strategy” to develop commercial crew vehicles to carry astronauts to the International Space Station that could result in costly delays in the program, according to a new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.
“In addition, the program is concerned that certification could be delayed, in part, because of a lack of design maturity in the companies’ crew vehicles,” the report states. “Both companies held critical design reviews in 2015 and each had several key crew vehicle subsystems designs that were not yet mature.”
NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is on “an aggressive schedule” to certify Boeing’s Starliner and SpaceX’s Dragon crew vehicles by the end of 2017, the GAO says in its report, “NASA: Assessment of Major Projects.” The vehicles would then be used on a commercial basis to transport crews to ISS.
“Boeing and SpaceX have yet to complete the majority of their critical test events and there is little time between test events for the companies to learn from them and make changes,” the report reads.
“Both companies plan to complete their uncrewed and crewed demonstration missions that are intended to test key system capabilities including their ability to launch, dock with the International Space Station (ISS), and return to Earth in 2017 and there are only about 4 months between each of these demonstrations,” the GAO said.
“Boeing does not plan to complete the final lower-level component design reviews for crew life support systems until May 2016 and SpaceX does not plan to completely mature its Dragon seat designs until spring 2016,” the GAO added. “Our best practice work shows that having a stable design prior to hardware fabrication can reduce the risk of rework efforts that could result in cost increases and schedule delays.”
NASA has secured additional seats aboard Russian Soyuz transports for 2018 to accommodate any delays in the Commercial Crew Program.\
“Moving forward, if the program receives inadequate funding to finance planned contract work, it could be required to renegotiate the contract, which may result in price increases and schedule delays,” according to the report.
The GAO report also found that:
- Boeing requested variances for aspects of Starliner and Atlas V designs that do not meet fault tolerance requirements;
- SpaceX has requested a variance to use commercial-off-the-shelf parts in certain applications rather than specially tested “space-rated” parts ;
- NASA officials are concerned Starliner and Dragon could fall short of the Commercial Crew Program’s 1 in 270 loss of crew requirement.
Space agency officials are also working through issues involving modifications being made to the Atlas V and Falcon 9 launchers. United Launch Alliance is adding a second engine to its Centaur upper stage for Starliner launches. The modified launch vehicle will need to be certified for crew flights.
The concern with SpaceX’s Falcon 9 involves the use of densified fuel.
“SpaceX plans to load crew into the Dragon and then fuel the rocket to keep the densified propellants chilled,” the GAO reported. “The program has reported that loading the crew prior to the propellant is a potential safety risk. SpaceXstated that its approach will improve safety by minimizing personnel exposure to a fueled rocket.”
The relevant section of the GAO’s report is reproduced below.
The purpose of the Commercial Crew Program is to facilitate the development of safe, reliable, and cost-effective crew transportation systems (CTS) to carry NASA astronauts and cargo to and from the International Space Station (ISS). The program is a multi-phase effort that started in 2010 to stimulate private-sector interest in providing commercial human space transportation capabilities. The current Transportation Capabilities phase is intended to result in the final certification of CTSs for crewed flights. In September 2014, NASA awarded firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX for the design, development, test, and operation of CTSs; a minimum of two, but up to six crewed missions to ISS; and special studies, tests, and analysis.
The Commercial Crew Program is working to an aggressive schedule to certify Boeing and SpaceX CTSs by the end of 2017, at which point they could be used for crewed flights to and from ISS. To meet this schedule, Boeing and SpaceX are concurrently developing, testing, and producing their vehicles—a high risk strategy that could lead to costly modifications to systems already being built and delays if problems are identified during testing. NASA has tried to minimize its cost risk on the program by using firm-fixed-price contracts. In addition, the program is concerned that certification could be delayed, in part, because of a lack of design maturity in the companies’ crew vehicles. Both companies held critical design reviews in 2015 and each had several key crew vehicle subsystems designs that were not yet mature. The program put Boeing and SpaceX on contract in 2015 for their first post-certification missions. The companies will need to complete the certification process before these flights.
NASA held an agency review in October 2015 to establish cost and schedule baselines for the Commercial Crew Program, but it has not yet finalized its decisions from the review, including the amount of cost and schedule reserves it will hold for risk mitigation activities.
The Commercial Crew Program is working to an aggressive schedule to certify Boeing and SpaceX’s CTSs by the end of 2017. To meet this schedule, Boeing and SpaceX are concurrently developing, testing, and producing their vehicles. Overlaps between these activities increase the risk that problems identified during development or testing could lead to costly modifications to systems already being built and schedule delays. NASA has tried to minimize its cost risk on the program by using firm-fixed-price contracts. The program ordered the first post-certification missions from the companies in 2015 before they completed development or tested their CTSs. These orders are made 2 to 3 years prior to actual mission dates in order to provide time for each company to manufacture and assemble the launch vehicle and spacecraft.
Boeing and SpaceX have yet to complete the majority of their critical test events and there is little time between test events for the companies to learn from them and make changes. Both companies plan to complete their uncrewed and crewed demonstration missions that are intended to test key system capabilities including their ability to launch, dock with the International Space Station (ISS), and return to Earth in 2017 and there are only about 4 months between each of these demonstrations. The companies will need to successfully complete these demonstrations and the certification process before they can fly post-certification missions. NASA extended its contract with the Russian Federal Space Agency to procure additional seats on the Soyuz vehicle through 2018 to ensure that it has access to ISS if delays occur.
The Commercial Crew Program is monitoring several design-related issues that could delay final CTS certification, including the maturity of Boeing and SpaceX’s current designs and the ability of the companies to meet NASA requirements and standards. Both Boeing and SpaceX held critical design reviews in 2015, but will not complete design activities until later than planned.
Boeing held a critical design review in March 2015 for its CTS, which includes the Starliner crew vehicle, Atlas V launch vehicle, and ground systems, and a follow-on review in May 2015 that focused on the design of the launch vehicle and launch site.
SpaceX held the first part of a multi-part critical design review in October 2015, which focused on the design of its launch vehicle—an upgraded version of the Falcon 9—and uncrewed ground systems, and the second part in December 2015, which focused on the Crew Dragon capsule and mission operations. An additional critical design review is planned to be completed by August 2016 for any remaining Dragon component or subsystem designs, including an updated seat design, and the crewed ground systems.
The program is tracking risks related to the design maturity of both companies’ crew vehicles because they have several key subsystem designs that are not yet mature.
For example, Boeing does not plan to complete the final lower-level component design reviews for crew life support systems until May 2016 and SpaceX does not plan to completely mature its Dragon seat designs until spring 2016. Our best practice work shows that having a stable design prior to hardware fabrication can reduce the risk of rework efforts that could result in cost increases and schedule delays. For the parts of the CTS designs that are mature, the program is using a design change control process to assess the potential effects of proposed design changes on safety, and to approve or disapprove the companies’ proposed changes.
Both companies have requested variances, or permission from the program to deviate from certain NASA requirements and design standards. If the program does not approve some of these variances, it could force the companies to make design changes, which could have cost and schedule implications for the companies.
For example, Boeing requested variances for aspects of both the Starliner and Atlas V designs that do not meet fault tolerance requirements, which are requirements related to the ability of a system to continue operating should a component error or failure occur.
SpaceX has requested a variance to use commercial-off-the-shelf parts in certain applications rather than parts that have gone through special testing to be considered “space-rated.” SpaceX officials said that they have used this approach and proven that it is reliable for multiple short-duration cargo missions.
Overall, the program is taking several steps to mitigate these types of issues, including accommodating the companies’ specific ways of doing business, limiting changes to requirements that might lead to design changes, and actively engaging with the companies on requested variances.
The Commercial Crew Program is also concerned that it may fall short of meeting the program’s loss of crew requirement based on the current CTS designs. The program’s loss of crew requirement is 1 in 270, which is a measure of how likely there will be loss of crew on a given mission. This is an increase in the requirement from the end of the Space Shuttle program, which was about 1 in 90. Boeing and SpaceX are responsible for meeting a loss of crew requirement of 1 in 200, and the program is responsible for closing the gap between that requirement and the one for the program.
The program conducted assessments of each company’s designs in order to meet the overall requirement and determined that it would be challenging without additional spacecraft modifications to protect against micrometeoroid and orbital debris. The companies would need to make these design changes soon, as they are both moving into manufacturing their systems. The program has established a team to develop a plan to close the requirements gap.
The Commercial Crew Program is working to address a number of launch vehicle issues that will need to be resolved prior to certifying that the vehicles are safe to transport crew.
- Boeing’s selected launch vehicle, the Atlas V, is being modified by adding a new emergency detection system and a second engine to its upper stage, so that it can be certified for human space flight and meet fault tolerance requirements.The Commercial Crew Program is working through the variances the launch vehicle provider has submitted for the new upper stage and plans to complete mitigation plans by April 2016 to resolve any remaining risk of certifying the modified Atlas V for human space flight.
- SpaceX’s launch vehicle, the Falcon 9, has been upgraded to improve its performance by increasing engine thrust and using densified propellants. Among the risks associated with the upgraded vehicle is SpaceX’s planned concept of operations for launching using densified propellants. SpaceX plans to load crew into the Dragon and then fuel the rocket to keep the densified propellants chilled. The program has reported that loading the crew prior to the propellant is a potential safety risk. SpaceXstated that its approach will improve safety by minimizing personnel exposure to a fueled rocket. It has also identified safety and hazard controls to mitigate any risks associated with this approach. In December 2015, SpaceX launched the upgraded Falcon 9 for the first time and successfully landed its first stage on land.
One of the Commercial Crew Program’s top risks during 2015 was funding uncertainty, but this appears to have been alleviated with the passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. In the Act, the program received funding in the amount requested by NASA. According to NASA, one of the reasons for the funding uncertainty was confusion over the way NASA is financing the contracts. The design, development, test, and evaluation activities in the contract that culminate in certification are fixed-price. The program uses performance-based payments, also referred to as milestone payments, to finance Boeing and SpaceX, and they are only paid after the successful completion of a milestone. The program designated five mandatory milestones, such as the certification review, and the companies developed a set of interim milestones. Under a fixed-price contract with performance-based financing payments, the contractors’ incurred costs are irrelevant, and the milestone payments help finance the contract through development to completion. For example, the companies might use milestone payments received for completing the critical design review milestones to purchase hardware for test articles. Moving forward, if the program receives inadequate funding to finance planned contract work, it could be required to renegotiate the contract, which may result in price increases and schedule delays.
Project Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Commercial Crew Program officials stated that having at least two companies developing different crew transportation systems provides benefits in redundancy, innovation, and cost effectiveness. They also stated that the program was not funded at the levels requested in the President’s Budget request during fiscal years 2011-2015, which were critical years of design and development. They emphasized that adequate and timely funding and maintaining competition between the two companies are essential to ensuring program performance. Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, and SpaceX officials provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.